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Abstract 
International Criminal Law is experiencing what has been termed a ‘critical turn’. With 
several states declaring their intentions to withdraw from the International Criminal Court’s 
constituting treaty in 2016, it seems that critique has never been more timely or necessary. 
The body of work roughly grouped under an approach referred to as Critical Approaches to 
International Criminal Law (CAICL) has contributed to the debate by foregrounding a 
structural critique instead of an effectiveness critique (which asks how ICL can be improved). 
We propose that the structural critique may be further developed through an engagement with 
liberal peacekeeping critique. This body of work, which is critical of liberal peacebuilding 
practices, has many overlapping points of departure with ongoing CAICL work, including its 
focus on questions of political economy, its insistence on a historical sensitivity and its 
skepticism of a politics of interventionism. The two fields are also criticized in similar terms, 
including their tendency towards over-generalization and distance from practice-relevant 
issues.  We argue that these disciplines can learn from one another’s strengths and 
weaknesses, thereby enriching discourses and practices of critique.  
Key words 
Critical approaches to international criminal law, liberal peacebuilding, critique, hegemony, 
governmentality. 
1. Introduction 
On 18 March 2018, President Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines announced his intentions to 
withdraw from the Rome Statute, ‘effective immediately’.  The announcement came just over 1
a month after the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) Chief Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda 
issued a statement that her Office was opening a preliminary examination of the situation in 
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relation to the drug war in the Philippines.  It was the second state to respond in this way. 2
Burundi announced its withdrawal in October 2016, six months after a preliminary 
investigation into possible crimes against humanity was launched by the Prosecutor.  In both 3
states, the discourse surrounding withdrawal was permeated by accusations that the ICC 
served as an agent of Western interests. Whether this was political opportunism or a sustained 
attempt at resisting neo-colonialism, it is not only despots in the Global South who are raising 
concerns about international criminal justice. Critiques from the Global South are 
furthermore complemented by a disillusionment among supporters of international criminal 
law in the Global North.  
Certainly, some of the discontent springs from the inherent problems generally 
attached to all criminal justice domestically or internationally. From a victim point of view, 
this might be summarized as – ‘we ask for justice, you give us law’.  More specifically to 4
international criminal law (ICL), the political constraints, selectivity, costliness and 
inordinate lengths that inhere in international criminal trials, mean that claims regarding its 
‘post-romantic’ phase are no longer unusual.  Despite a continuous reference to the youth of 5
the discipline, after more than a decade of reflection on the lessons of the ad hoc tribunals 
and fifteen years of an active ICC, some of the voices of discontent about ICL as a project 
 Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Mrs. Fatou Bensouda, on opening Preliminary 2
Examinations into the situations in the Philippines and in Venezuela, 8 February 2018, available online at 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=180208-otp-stat (visited at 19 June 2018). 
 Human Rights Watch, ‘Burundi: ICC Withdrawal Major Loss to Victims: Latest Move Shows Government's 3
Disregard for Victims’ (2016) Human Rights Watch, available online at https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/10/27/
burundi-icc-withdrawal-major-loss-victims (visited at 19 June 2018)
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Reconfiguration of Victimhood’, in C. De Vos, S. Kendall, and C.Stahn (eds), Contested Justice: The Politics 
and Practice of International Criminal Court Interventions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 
272.
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have emerged in a sustained challenge to ICL’s rationale. What has emerged are a number of 
scholarly projects that challenge the assumptions on which ICL’s institutions are premised 
and that interrogate in a deeper way how power circulates within the field of ICL. Indeed, 
some now argue that ‘the critical note has come to dominate the discourse.’  A sustained, if 6
not necessarily itself coherent, attempt at finding a common critical note, is the body of 
critique loosely bundled under Critical Approaches to International Criminal Law (CAICL). 
Although an informal and multifarious network, CAICL provides a platform for a distinct 
way of thinking about ICL as a field of contestation over meaning, methods and solutions, a 
means by which concerns about its regulative and symbolic functions is formulated.  It both 7
builds on and supplements concurrent feminist  and TWAIL  critiques that interrogate ICL’s 8 9
embedded political, economic and gender biases.  
  Overall, the impact of this structural critique on policy or practice has been minor,  10
while the impact of structural critique on more mainstream scholarship is also questionable. It 
is productive, therefore, to think about how other disciplines have attempted to bridge gaps 
 D. Robinson, ‘Inescapable Dyads: Why the International Criminal Court Cannot Win’, 28 Leiden Journal of 6
International Law (2015) 323, at 324. Others disagree. Michelle Burgis-Kasthala, for example, argues that ‘the 
dominant paradigm informing ICL scholarship is a positivist, liberal one which favours doctrinal writing or at 
most, discourse analysis about the normative underpinnings of the ICL project.’ (M. Burgis-Kasthala, 
‘Scholarship as Dialogue? TWAIL and the Politics of Methodology’,14 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice (2016) 921, at 927).
 C. Schwöbel, ‘Introduction’ in C Schwöbel (ed), Critical Approaches to International Criminal Law (London: 7
Routledge, 2015), 1.
 See for example L. Chappell, The Politics of Gender Justice at the International Criminal Court: Legacies and 8
Legitimacy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) and F. Ní Aoláin, ‘Gendered Harms and their Interface with 
International Criminal Law: Norms, Challenges and Domestication’, 16 International Feminist Journal of 
Politics (2014) 622.
 See symposium of Journal of International Criminal Justice on TWAIL and the ICC edited by Asad 9
Kiyani, John Reynolds and Sujith Xavier in 14 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2016) 915-1009.
 It is notable that there are emerging efforts at integrating structural critique in ICL into advocacy work. See, 10
for example, the Global Legal Action Network, which works with innovative legal strategies. Several members 
of the Legal Action Committee are also engaged in scholarly work around the CAICL project (available online 
at http://www.glanlaw.org/about-us, date visited 19 June 2018).
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between mainstream and critical scholarship and between theory and praxis. One critical field 
that we suggest offers valuable insights is the critique of liberal peacebuilding, which shares 
many of the same concerns about peacebuilding as a liberal project as CAICL has about ICL. 
Notably, the liberal peacebuilding critique has moved beyond a deconstruction phase to what 
can be described as an emancipatory one: developing a counter-project to liberal 
peacebuilding, enduring its own difficulties in deciding whether to engage ‘the mainstream’ 
and in gaining the attention of that ‘mainstream’, and facing its own counter-critique. These 
are challenges that any critical orientation faces, and yet they are of particular interest to the 
CAICL project in the substantive parallels of critique, namely a sensitivity to questions of 
political economy, an insistence on historical sensitivity and skepticism of a politics of 
interventionism.  
 In the following, we examine the development of critical projects in ICL and 
peacebuilding. We then discuss the similarities in the critiques between the two disciplines. 
We follow this with an examination of emergent counter-critiques and their possible crises of 
relevance. Finally, we draw some tentative conclusions. 
2. The Justice Project, the Peace Project, and Their Critics 
ICL is a project which has multiple goals, emphasizing the need for justice to be done in the 
courtroom in order for a society which has experienced mass atrocity to transition to a 
peaceful society. The growth of ICL, as a body of rules and practices, has spawned ad hoc 
tribunals, hybridized courts and the permanent ICC, as well as a surrounding industry of 
judges, lawyers and administrators, NGOs and activists, scholars, think-tanks, specialised 
journals and university programmes. The core principles that unite this disparate coterie of 
people and institutions are a fidelity to the principles of both individual criminal 
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responsibility and due process, a desire to bring to justice the ‘big fish’ over the ‘small fry’, 
and the elevation of the needs of ‘humanity’ over traditional principles of immunity. ICL is 
grounded in both deontological and consequentialist claims. Deontologically, ICL assumes 
that rational individuals enjoy volition, act in accordance with what their rationality dictates 
and fundamentally enjoy autonomy over their actions, and should be punished whenever and 
wherever this leads them to commit (mass) atrocity. As such, ICL is a classically liberal 
project that attempts ‘to fix individual responsibility for history’s violent march.’  This is 11
accompanied by consequentialist claims about deterrence of violence,  the importance of the 12
rule of law,  and alleviation of suffering .  13 14
Prior to the recent critical turn, scholarship in ICL was characterised by an ‘overly 
protective’ literature given the reluctance to criticise a nascent ICC with powerful 
detractors.  And so the historical evolutionary tale was one which emphasized progress: 15
From recognition of individual criminal responsibility for gross human rights abuses to a 
permanent international court underpinned by a multilateral treaty ratified by the majority of 
the world’s states. It incorporated a whiggish teleology of law against politics, reason against 
passion, right against might. ICL therefore employs a highly evocative vocabulary redolent of 
 A. Marston Danner and J.S. Martinez, ‘Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command 11
Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law’, 93 California Law Review (2005) 75, at 
75.
 T. Meron, ‘The Case for War Crimes Trials in Yugoslavia’ in Meron (ed), War Crimes Law Comes of Age 12
(Oxford: OUP 1998), 187, 196. See also the jurisprudence on deterrence, for example, in Prosecutor v 
Rutaganda ICTR-96-3-T, para 456 (6 December 1999).
 Fatou Bensouda comments: ‘The mission to entrench the rule of law and attain normative global justice is a 13
continuous journey that has seen the emergence and increasing acceptance of international criminal law as 
pivotal and indispensable in the fight against impunity’ in F. Bensouda, ‘A Tribute to Adam Dieng’ in C. R. 
Majinge (ed), Rule of Law Through Human and International Criminal Justice. Essays in Honour of Adam 
Dieng (CUP 2015) 48.
 J. J. Savelsberg, ‘International Criminal Law as One Response to World Suffering: General Observations and 14
the Case of Darfur’ in R. E. Anderson, Alleviating World Suffering: The Challenge of Negative Quality of Life 
(Springer 2017) 361-373.
 Robinson, supra note 6, at 324.15
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heroism, if not messianism - it combats ‘radical evil,’ prosecutes ‘the worst of the worst,’ and 
sets itself in existential opposition to persecution, mass murder, rape and torture. The ad hoc 
tribunals and Rome Statute were seen as a welcome institutionalised affirmation of absolute 
moral sentiments that went unrealised for so long.  The expectation was that ICL could and 16
would ‘exert broad influence on both the development of international humanitarian law and 
its humanisation.’   17
  
A. Critique of ICL  
 As Frédéric Mégret acknowledges, everyone assessing ICL is in some way 
critical of it; few, if any, of its defenders engage in full-blooded apologias for it.  Admissions 18
that the ‘honeymoon’ is over are commonplace.  However, before the aforementioned 19
critical literatures emerged, and before the voices from the Global South were to be heard in 
the silos and echo-chambers of The Hague, Geneva and New York, the most common and 
prominent of critiques were those from a positivist tradition which focused on the 
effectiveness of existing structures and how they could be strengthened. Far from amounting 
to a deep engagement with the politics of the field, much of the criticism of ICL was 
pragmatic and policy-oriented advice aiming to make its institutions better at dealing with the 
complexities that face it, ‘tak[ing] the “big questions as answered” and work[ing] from within 
 A. Cassese, ‘Reflections on International Criminal Justice’, 61 Modern Law Review (1998) 1.16
 T. Meron, ‘The Humanization of Humanitarian Law’, 94 American Journal of International Law (2000) 239, 17
at 243
 F. Mégret, ‘International Criminal Justice: A Critical Research Agenda’ in Schwöbel (ed), supra note 7, at 18
17-18.
 D. Luban, ‘After the Honeymoon: Reflections on the Current State of International Criminal Justice’, 11 19
Journal of International Criminal Justice (2013) 505, 509.
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limitations that are more or less taken for granted and not necessarily seen as problematic.’  20
Much mainstream critique effectively constitutes a mild concession of the field’s 
imperfections tempered by renewed statements of unqualified faith in its promise and 
progress if these blemishes can be effaced.  Problems with ICL continue to be posed as 21
issues of implementation, not orientation; of communication, not perpetuation of inequalities. 
As such, these more mainstream criticisms are best described as an efficiency critique, rooted 
in liberalism and concerned that ICL has failed to live up to its values (due process, 
independence, modes of responsibility, complementarity) or to its promise (accountability, 
expressionism, a more peaceful state).  As Michelle Burgis-Kasthala puts it, ‘[i]f “setbacks” 22
are acknowledged, a range of responses centring on a lack of enforcement and suggestions 
for improvement ensure that the progress narrative prevails.’   23
The CAICL critique, by contrast, does not evaluate ICL on the basis of success or 
failure in these regards, but rather explores the presumptions that ICL is inherently 
humanising, healing, emancipatory or dignifying.  It asks who benefits from the existing 24
parameters of ICL, who loses through them, and why. It is this reorientation from a technical 
to a structural critique which marks out CAICL as a distinctive form of criticism. Whilst 
positivist critiques tended to reaffirm the benefits of ICL’s inherent liberalism and started 
from the position of the ICC’s powerlessness in the world of politics, for those interested in 
structural problems, many of ICL’s issues lie in its embeddedness within a liberal, colonialist 
 Mégret, supra note 18, at 18.20
 T. Krever, ‘International Criminal Law: An Ideology Critique’, 26 Leiden Journal of International Law 21
(2013) 701, at 710.
 Schwöbel, ‘Introduction’, supra note 7.22
 Burgis-Kasthala, supra note 6, at 927.23
 S. Kendall, ‘Critical Orientations: A Critique of International Criminal Court Practice’ in Schwöbel (ed), 24
supra note 7, at 59.
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or masculinist legal paradigm whose rules enable the power of ICL institutions. For these 
critics, analysis of power relations between ICL, the international community and subject 
states is too often excluded within an ICL scholarship convinced of the immunity of 
international courts and tribunals from politics and overwhelmingly oriented towards 
positivist assessment of judgments and treaty provisions.  Those (knowingly or 25
unknowingly) connected to the CAICL project, in particular, aim to acknowledge the politics 
of ICL, not necessarily rejecting a political role for the courts but emphasising the need to 
understand these political dimensions and to question the type of politics enacted in 
individual cases.  Without such acknowledgment, and bearing in mind its simplified moral 26
messaging and ostensible aversion to political contention, ICL became a comforting language 
with which to address crises and articulate human projects.  The CAICL literature has 27
developed a wide-ranging critique of the role of ICL in both the international global liberal 
architecture and the domestic states in which it intervenes. However, having come this far, 
the obvious question is what happens next? As Susan Marks argues, enquiry in ideology 
critique ‘is motivated not only by curiosity alone, but also by a sense of injustice, a wish to 
break down barriers to the enjoyment of social goods.’   28
For some, the critique must concern itself not only with deconstruction but with 
empowerment, openly serving a better politics, erring on the side of engagement that is 
empowering and sensitive, and not impositional or chauvinistic. To the extent that it 
 Ibid., 56-57.25
 S. Nouwen and W.G. Werner, ‘Doing Justice to the Political: The International Criminal Court in Uganda and 26
Sudan’, 21 European Journal of International Law (2011) 941.
 C. Schwöbel, ‘The Comfort of International Criminal Law’ (2013) Law & Critique 169, at 170.27
 S. Marks, The Riddle of All Constitutions: International Law, Democracy and the Critique of ideology 28
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 121.
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embraces this mission, critique becomes an unabashedly political project, concerned with 
more than mere rejectionism, testing the assumptions of ICL to redirect its attention to new 
possibilities.  To the extent that one succeeds in engaging positively, can concern and 29
commitment realistically be transmuted into emancipatory projects in the context of the 
institutional limitations of the international criminal courts and tribunals and international 
criminal justice at large? If critical scholars are to constructively engage with questions of 
criminal justice, must critical distance necessarily give way to the compromises and 
complicities of involvement? In answering these questions, we suggest that there are lessons 
to be learned from the liberal peacebuilding critique which followed a similar trajectory from 
disparate critical appraisals of post-conflict peace building activities to a reasonably coherent 
(though far from uniform) body of study to pondering the question of policy relevance and/or 
complicity.  
B. Critique of Liberal Peacebuilding 
In post-conflict states ravaged by war, broken institutions and political instability, 
peacebuilding is usually labelled ‘liberal’ because (a) it is generally conducted by Western 
liberal states, (b) whose interventions are underpinned by liberal motivations, most notably 
the response to actual or foreseen mass breaches of human rights, and (c) they pursue liberal 
goals such as democracy, rule of law and market economics.  The core tenet of this 30
paradigm is the assumption that the best grounding for peace within conflicted states is a 
liberal democratic polity and a market-oriented economy. Central sites of peacebuilding 
practice and discussion have been post-conflict Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan, the Democratic 
 B. Sander, ‘International Criminal Justice as Progress: From Faith to Critique’ in M. Bergsmo et al (eds), 29
Historical Origins of International Criminal Law: Volume 4 (Oslo: TOAEP 2015) 749, at 824.
 D. Zaum, ‘Beyond the Liberal Peace’, 18 Global Governance (2012) 121, at 121-122.30
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Republic of Congo, Lebanon, and Haiti among others. Key institutions in the 
conceptualization and implementation of liberal peacebuilding techniques have been the 
United Nations (and within it the UN Peacebuilding Commission), the International 
Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. The liberal peacebuilding model has primarily been 
criticized for its underwhelming empirical record. Civil war recurrence rates of around 67% 
of post-conflict countries during the 1990s and nearly 90% in the first decade of the 2000s 
sparked the initial attention of critics to the failure of the international community to end 
cycles of war and repression.  Using various methodologies, scholars estimate that anything 31
from 25% to 50% of intrastate peace settlements break down in the following five to ten 
years.  Liberal peacebuilding has also been seen to fail on its own normative terms. Past 32
peacebuilding missions have featured unwanted legacies of increased ethnic violence, public 
protest, grossly unequal economies, neopatrimonialism, electoral irregularities and gender 
disparities. The governments which peacebuilding missions have promoted or assisted 
consistently confront challenges of legitimacy, capacity and economic underdevelopment. 
Poverty is rarely reduced even after significant international intervention. Many countries 
subject to peacebuilding missions remain clustered at the bottom of the United Nations 
Development Programme’s Human Development Report. As Belloni argues, ‘[i]t has become 
commonplace to state that liberal peacebuilding in war-torn states has, by and large, failed.’  33
 One of the reasons why the liberal peacebuilding critique is more established is that it 
has been around longer as a body of critique. While the main impetus for both peacebuilding 
 C. Call, Why Peace Fails: The Causes and Prevention of Civil War Recurrence (Washington DC: Georgetown 31
University Press, 2012)
 Eg. A. Suhrke and I. Samset, ‘What’s in a Figure? Estimating Recurrence of Civil War’, 14 International 32
Peacekeeping (2007) 195,citing around 23% and P. Martin, ‘Coming Together: Power-Sharing and the 
Durability of Negotiated Settlements’, 15 Civil Wars (2013) 332, at 334, citing a half.
 R. Belloni, ‘Hybrid Peace Governance: Its Emergence and Significance’, 18 Global Governance (2012) 21, at 33
21.
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and ICL dates back to the post-Cold War era of liberal interventionism beginning in the early 
1990s, the critique developed at different paces. In part, this is most likely due to the close 
academic-practitioner link that has characterized ICL; this has arguably tempered critique. 
Many of the scholars concerned with international criminal law at the time (even if it was not 
yet a distinct discipline) were indeed instrumental in drafting the Rome Statute, some taking 
up key positions within the newly established tribunals. While ICL therefore enjoyed a 
prolonged period of general scholarly support well into the new century as the ad hoc 
tribunals grew in strength and the ICC came to life, critique of peacebuilding practice in the 
likes of Cambodia, Bosnia and Kosovo was well in train by the end of the 1990s.  The 34
failings of peacebuilding were arguably both more evident and perhaps more catastrophic 
than ICL's failures and so a much larger critical literature built up over time. While CAICL 
has thus far generated a small cannon and has impacted only at the margins of mainstream 
scholarship of ICL, so sustained and successful has the liberal peace building critique become 
that it is credible to argue it has become the ‘new mainstream’.   35
 Both fields of critique share similar starting points. CAICL interrogates the 
presuppositions that enchant ICL, challenges existing institutions by searching for obscured 
interests or class domination and is consciously sensitive to exclusions, oppressions and 
suppression.  Similarly the liberal peacebuilding critique is ‘self-consciously radical, 36
antithetical to realist analysis and rejects some of the dominant paradigms in peace research 
to concentrate on relatively neglected matters like underdevelopment and social exclusion at 
 E.g. D. Chandler, Bosnia: Faking Democracy after Dayton (London: Pluto Press, 2000).34
 S. Hameiri, ‘A Reality Check for the Critique of the Liberal Peace’, in S. Campbell, D. Chandler and M. 35
Sabaratnam (eds) A Liberal Peace? The Problems and Practices of Peacebuilding (London: Zed Books, 2011) 
191, at 192.
 I. Tallgren, ‘Who Are “We” in International Criminal Law? On Critics and Membership’ in Schwöbel (ed), 36
supra note 7, 75.
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the level of individuals and communities that more orthodox analyses ignore.’  Critics of 37
liberal peacebuilding ask how peacebuilders produce and reproduce its authoritative claims, 
just as ICL critics do. Like the latter, they ask what forms of power course through the object 
of their enquiry, and how they are obscured within a technical language of policy documents, 
the principle of the Responsibility to Protect or the Rome Statute. Just as ICL critics unsettle 
assumptions of international criminal courts and tribunals as inherently dignifying and 
legitimate, peacebuilding critics unsettle assumptions of democracy, statebuilding and 
liberalised economies as inherently pacific. Even some of the self-identified weaknesses are 
similar. While Immi Tallgren admits the intrusions of the ICL critique may of necessity be 
‘crude’  and Mégret accepts the allegations of occasional ‘posturing’ in the critique,  Roger 38 39
Mac Ginty concedes that at times the peacebuilding critique has gone ‘far beyond the 
boundaries of careful and value-free academic discourse.’  Even the future development of 40
both fields engendered similar doubts. Just as CAICL contributions ponder an irrelevance/
absorption dilemma (critique being confined to either irrelevance in practice or absorption in 
the very liberal project it critiques) , critics of peacebuilding wrestle with the question of 41
whether they ‘should follow the red herring and present alternative “blueprints” or remain 
 R. Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance: Hybrid Forms of Peace (London: Palgrave 37
Macmillan, 2011), 22-23.
 Tallgren, ‘Who Are “We”?’, supra note 36, at 89.38
  Mégret, supra note 18, at 44.39
 Mac Ginty, supra note 37, at 23.40
  Mégret, supra note 18, at 45.41
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true to its own raison d'être, by pointing out contradictions, engaging with strategic 
discourses, increasing context sensitivity from within.’  42
 The aptness of the liberal peace building critique as a comparator for CAICL is best 
illustrated by the similarity of the theoretical approaches. Just as critique of ICL is divided 
between the effectiveness critique from liberalism and a more radical critique of liberalism, 
peacebuilding criticism is divided by two main schools that could be roughly distinguished as 
the moderate policy-oriented ideas-based critique on one side, and the radical power-based 
critique on the other.  The radical critiques of liberalism are suspicious of Western 43
interventionist rationales, seeing the discursive techniques that emphasise free politics and 
open markets as a façade behind which Western hegemony is concealed, self-interest is 
obfuscated and exploitative global structures are legitimated. By contrast (and echoing the 
positivist, effectiveness-based critics seen in ICL), the more policy-oriented, moderate 
critiques of peacebuilding accept the legitimacy of liberal values and of intervention, but 
contend that political and economic reforms need to be modulated or delayed on the basis 
that post-conflict and developing world states are unsuited to their prescriptive rationalities.  44
Policy-oriented critiques judge peacebuilding interventions for their failure to either live up 
to their own aspirations and norms or their failure to inculcate them domestically. On the 
ground, moderate critics are concerned with sequencing interventions and reforms to 
guarantee liberal outcomes in the long run. They do not question the implicit value of 
 S. Tadjbakhsh and O. Richmond, ‘Conclusion: Typologies and Modifications Proposed by Critical 42
Approaches’ in S. Tadjbakhsh (ed), Rethinking the Liberal Peace. External Models and Local Alternatives 
(London: Routledge 2011) 221, at 233.
 These distinctions are drawn in T. Paffenholz, ‘Unpacking the Local Turn in Peacebuilding: A Critical 43
Assessment Towards an Agenda for Future Research’,36 Third World Quarterly (2015) 857, at 861 and D. 
Chandler, International Statebuilding: The Rise of Post-Liberal Governance (London: Routledge, 2010) 24.
 See for example R. Paris, At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge 44
University Press, 2004).
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liberalism, and so maintain an inherently conservative status quo. Power-based critics, by 
contrast, seek a radically different post-liberal peace, and are suspicious of the inequalities 
inherent in global power relations that revolve around the interests of the Global North and a 
Eurocentric Weltanschaung. The tendency of problem-solvers in both peacebuilding and ICL 
to ‘work with what we’ve got’ represents a missed opportunity ‘to interrogate the order itself 
and, by accepting it as “reality”, re-inforces its underlying values and structures.’  45
  
3. Parallel Critiques 
Given the similarities of critique and obvious political sympathies, it is curious that the 
CAICL literature has yet to fully engage with the liberal peacebuilding critique in a 
systematic way, and vice-versa. If, as section 2 goes on to argue, statebuilding represents a 
policy of global securitisation, democracy a form of global political homogenisation, and 
marketisation a core element of a globalised economy, it is possible to see ICL as the legal 
dimension of peacebuilding. Just as peacebuilders attribute conflict to the lack of a state, 
democracy and/or the market, ICL ascribes instances of mass atrocity to the absence of 
criminal accountability which leaves military and political power with an essentially 
untrammeled power to abuse their own or neighbouring populations. Like peacebuilding, ICL 
views itself as a core element of conflict management.  Indeed, the Office of the Prosecutor 46
implicitly acknowledges a type of division of labour in its insistence that its concern with the 
‘interests of justice’ under Article 53 Rome Statute be distinguished from the ‘interests of 
peace’ which falls within the mandate of other institutions, most notably the UN Security 
 M. Pugh, ‘The Political Economy of Peacebuilding: A Critical Theory Perspective’, in A. Bellamy and P. 45
Williams (eds), Peace Operations and Global Order (London: Routledge, 2005) 39, at 41.
 ICC Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice (2007), available online at https://46
www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/library/organs/otp/ICC-OTP-InterestsOfJustice.pdf (visited at 19 June 2018), 
at 4.
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Council.  Like statebuilding, democratisation and economic liberalisation, ICL appears a 47
standard solution to ethnic conflict, virulent nationalism and religious fundamentalism.  48
Although ICL might not directly build a state, impose forms of democratic rule or open 
economies further, it is nevertheless seen by its critics as a form of power which has a bias 
for securitization, homogenization and marketization.  
In the following, we have organised what we see as the most important overlaps of critique 
and agenda in the two critical projects. Themselves intertwined and interdependent, the points 
of critique which we are highlighting regard: (a) the politics behind the technocratic language 
of intervention; (b) the hegemonic impulses behind the projects of peacebuilding and ICL; (c) 
the enabling of economic liberalism through projects of peacebuilding and ICL; and finally 
(d) complicity in conservative domestic politics. This ordering, apart from its inherent 
overlaps, also needs to be further qualified: The critical literature is in both fields far from 
homogenous; not only is critique different in its emphasis, it is also constantly moving in its 
subject-matter. Regardless of these differences, we believe that there are nevertheless strong 
affinities, both within the respective fields as well as across them, which are worth 
highlighting. 
A. Revealing the Politics behind Technocratic Language 
Perhaps the area with the greatest similarity between liberal peacebuilding critique and ICL 
critique is the challenge of naive technicism displayed in the self-presentation of those 
 Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Keynote Address to Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C. (2010), available 47
online at www.cfr.org/content/publications/.../MorenoOcampo.CFR.2.4.2010.pdf (visited at 19 June 2018), at 6.
 A view outlined but not shared in D. Zolo, ‘Peace Through Criminal Law?’, 2 Journal of International 48
Criminal Justice (2004) 711, at 727. 
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promoting peace and justice. Instead of questioning structural inequalities, those promoting 
liberal peace and ICL focus on technical issues which improve the process in question. 
Critics argue that peacebuilders apply a standardized toolbox consisting of elections, civil 
service, the justice sector, army and police, to widely varying conflict ecologies. These 
approaches ‘are inclined to see state-building as a matter of simple technology, as a set of 
technical skills or capacities, each of which can be acquired, refined and applied no matter 
what the context… They imply that each post-conflict problem has a logical state-building 
solution.’  In taking issue with peacebuilding’s self-presentation as an apolitical technology, 49
critics argue that problems of rule and control that revolve around state weakness are not the 
key dilemmas, but rather questions of allocations of resources.  Statebuilding and good 50
governance reframe public policy ‘not as an inherently political matter pertaining to conflict 
between competing and often irreconcilable interests, but as a matter of “expertise” and 
“good” management.’   51
        Indeed, to the extent that peacebuilding is content to leave these inequalities in place, 
this technical expertise serves as veiled ideological camouflage for the pathologies of 
peacebuilding.  Above all, technical activities like capacity-building serve to operationalise 52
 B. Bowden, H. Charlesworth and J. Farrall, ‘Introduction’, in B. Bowden, H. Charlesworth and J. Farrall 49
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the transnationalisation of the state and legitimise external political interference on a grand 
scale.   53
 ICL rests on the same universalist presumptions as democratisation, state building and 
the free market. Law in the ICL narrative can and must be considered on the basis of 
universal principles of justice, regardless of political pressures emanating from sovereignty, 
state boundaries, amnesty or one’s position as head of state. The ICC and ad hoc tribunals 
self-present as fundamentally legalist enterprises in the ‘Shklarian’ sense, animated by ‘the 
ethical attitude that holds moral conduct to be a matter of rule, and moral relationships to 
consist of duties and rights determined by rules.’  Law enjoys an inherently superior 54
position as neutral and objective justice, understood in contradistinction to ‘the unprincipled 
desultoriness and unpredictable vacillation of politics’.  The Office of the Prosecutor 55
consistently denies that politics has anything to do with justice - the ICC prosecutor Fatou 
Bensouda argues that the officials of the Court ‘have nothing to do with politics’ even if she 
recognises ‘we operate in a political atmosphere.’  There is of course an element of public 56
relations about this claim, but this underpins how central ICL’s self-projection of speaking 
law to power is to the project overall.  Given their stated commitment to explicate the 57
problems attached to ICL interventionism, it comes as no surprise that critics of ICL are 
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skeptical of this presentation of ICL as merely legal technique, as opposed to power. Building 
on a tradition of Critical Legal Studies (CLS) scholarship, it is argued that although the 
Office of the Prosecutor acts as if law were neutral, the discourses of international justice 
operate ideologically, masking the reproduction of political relations of power and inequality 
behind the façade of technique and impartiality.  The binary of individual guilt and 58
innocence obscures the historical reality that mass inequality and abuse can never be the 
responsibility of just a few individuals. Just as peacebuilding reduces issues of opportunity 
and social responsibility to prefabricated institutions, complex political, social, economic, 
and moral questions over historic culpability and distribution are reduced by ICL to ritualized 
legal maxims. As such, Tallgren argues, it naturalizes and excludes from the political battle 
‘certain phenomena which are in fact the pre-conditions for the maintaining of the existing 
governance.’    59
B.  Agents of Hegemony 
The critical peacebuilding school moreover interrogates the relationship between post-
conflict intervention and global governance. Peacebuilding is advocated by its supporters on 
the basis of consensual intervention to first stabilise states and then build harmonious 
societies after internal conflict. Peacebuilding critics see this form of governance as a tool 
imposing Western values about security, the state and economy to facilitate hegemonic 
control and exploitation of developing countries in a globalised world.  They believe that 60
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pressures of self-disciplining and a culture of hegemony are at work, curbing the self-
determination of intervened-upon societies while disavowing the open exercise of power and 
abjuring any responsibility for its actions. Mark Duffield, for example, argues that 
statebuilding constitutes an extension of international power over both the physical and 
political bodies of a population to secure a Western mass consumerist society from dangerous 
societies beyond its borders. By saving, developing and securing the ‘other,’ prolonged 
external intervention is justified.  The West’s peacebuilding agenda clouds its exercise of 61
power in humanitarian rhetoric, institutionalising asymmetries of power it benefits from 
instead of levelling a grossly uneven global playing field.   62
 Many of these criticisms are replicated in ICL. ICL, and in particular the ICC, is both 
symptomatic of, and productive of, the generation of global peace and security. The Rome 
Statute’s Preamble causally links the fight against impunity with the ‘peace, security and 
well-being of the world.’ The crimes punished are those ‘most serious crimes of concern to 
the international community,’ an idea best captured in the notion of crimes against humanity 
which suggests the crimes are committed symbolically, if not actually, against everyone on 
the planet. The means by which it does this (beyond the physical containment of arrestees) is 
through deterrence whereby the threat of punishment serves to rein in the actions of would-be 
malefactors in the situation under investigation, while the absence of punishment inevitably 
encourages further cycles of violence.  However, critics of ICL argue it manifests forms of 63
securitised Western hegemony, legitimising and upholding the existing division of power and 
privilege in the global order as an agent of global justice. Since the conflicts in the former 
 M. Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples (London: Polity 61
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Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the Security Council has spoken the language of criminal 
accountability, establishing or helping establish the ad hoc tribunals in The Hague and 
Arusha, as well as hybridised tribunals in East Timor, Kosovo, Lebanon, Cambodia and 
Sierra Leone, to say nothing of the referrals of the Darfur Situation in 2005 and Libya in 
2011.  The ability of the Security Council to make referrals to the ICC (Article 13(b) Rome 64
Statute) and ask for deferral of investigations for a renewable period of 12 months (Article 16 
Rome Statute) leaves it open to the criticism that ‘it is a tool for the exercise of the culture of 
superiority and to impose cultural superiority’.  Though the ICC does not exercise direct 65
control over states subject to investigations, the formal and informal threats and incentives it 
employs shape domestic policy, arguably replicating a modern form of justice civilsatrice 
oriented more towards global than domestic priorities.  Complementarity in particular 66
increasingly resembles a disciplinary exercise that privileges conformity with the Statute over 
legal pluralism.  67
 The implications of ICL’s role in reinforcing global law and order have alarmed many 
within the CAICL scholarship. The moderate form of worry is that international criminal 
tribunals could serve as an alibi for inaction in those areas too marginal to international 
interests, ‘instruments of therapeutic governance, providing an acceptable compromise 
between despicable apathy and authorisation of military interventions that UN members are 
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unwilling or unable to carry out: if not peace, then justice.’  The greater worry, however, 68
relates to the Court as an active intervener. Commission of war crimes can serve to justify 
Western intervention in the interests of humankind by delegitimising regimes and individuals, 
for example in relation to Saddam Hussein in Iraq  and Muammar Ghaddafi in Libya.  As 69 70
Sander argues, powerful states ‘have been able to instrumentalise the stigmatising power of 
international criminal courts both as a means to undermine the legitimacy of their enemies 
and to justify military campaigns against them in the name of supporting the cause of global 
justice.’  71
 A further strand in both critiques is the notion that intervention is highly selective. 
Peacebuilding critics assail the ‘failed state’ thesis employed to justify interventions on the 
basis of its selectivity, bearing in mind that certain states sharing many of the same 
characteristics as supposedly ‘failed states’ escaped any international involvement. Indeed, to 
some the failed state thesis smacks of a cynical construct employed by the international 
community as a flag of convenience during intervention.  Similarly, critics of ICL identify 72
selectivity as one of the primary symptoms of bias and hegemony in ICL. While the ICC has 
123 state parties, it does not bind major powers like the US, China, Russia and India (though 
their interests are seldom mutually compatible). Mahmood Mamdani argues that under the 
direction of the UN Security Council, the ICC has become an integral part of the international 
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Responsibility to Protect regime that permits the legal normalisation of certain types of 
violence (most notably Western counterinsurgency efforts in the likes of Iraq, Afghanistan 
and Libya) while criminalizing the violence in other states.  The overwhelming focus of the 73
Office of the Prosecutor on Africa in terms of ‘Situations Under Investigation’ (with the 
single exception of Georgia) and the fact that it remains the only continent where it has issued 
arrest warrants against suspected criminals has fostered the perception that the ICC represents 
a European Court for Africans.   74
C.  Facilitation and Legitimisation of Global Economic Liberalisation 
Peacebuilding agencies, most notably those in the UN, collaborate with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) in joint frameworks for supporting statebuilding, engage in mutual 
consultations over coordination and make the IFIs (international financial institutions, 
including the IMF and the World Bank) and other institutional donors core partners in all 
peacebuilding activities.  Although the IFIs pay lip-service to the distinctiveness of post-75
conflict countries and elaborate different policy agendas for them, the end-goal remains 
fundamentally the same as in any underdeveloped state, namely using governance ‘to make 
the state safe for the market’ by ensuring it is amendable to economic discipline, can 
implement laws necessary for liberalisation and withdraw from determining development 
 M. Mamdani, ‘Responsibility to Protect or Right to Punish?’ (2010) 4 Journal of Intervention and 73
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goals.  At a time when the state most needs to be active in protecting the economy through 76
tariffs or providing for the citizenry through subsidy, ‘the most conservative and limiting’ of 
neo-liberal economic models like privatisation of state and parastatal businesses, private-
sector led growth, macroeconomic stabilisation (inflation and deficit reduction) and service-
cutting budgetary management is imposed.  In the critical peacebuilding literature, 77
institutional governance reform and state-building are seen as a core aspect of the 
globalisation of capital,  while a liberal market is seen as inextricably bound with 78
democratization.  Peacebuilding is used less to address the root causes of conflict than to 79
impose ‘disciplinary’ or ‘shock-therapy’ neo-liberalism akin to traditional structural 
adjustment policies.  The external critique is essentially that peacebuilding is a form of 80
economic imperialism designed to protect the interests of the economic elite at the expense of 
post-conflict countries whose ability to generate basic legitimacy through meeting the needs 
of its citizens is eroded to a degree that makes future conflict more likely.  As Volker Boege 81
et al argue, external actors who ‘unscrupulously impose state-building in a very pragmatic 
fashion [are] not so much concerned about ideals of good governance, but about trade and 
monetary liberalisation, property privatization and other interventions advantageous to 
 R. Abrahamsen, Disciplining Democracy: Development Discourse and Good Governance in Africa  (London: 76
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external actors.’  Essentially, though liberal peacebuilding is primarily based around non-82
market activities like elections and state-building, it is critiqued for doing nothing to 
challenge fundamentally unfair global economic structures, instead normalising and 
legitimising them. 
 Similarly, ICL is critiqued as a means of implicitly legitimating unfair economic 
structures and ignoring the distributive functions of its central precepts. Indeed, insofar as it 
prioritises crimes that are less likely to occur in industrialised states, it is built on an inherent 
structural inequality between the Global North and South.  Just as peacebuilders monopolise 83
the political solutions to the roots of conflict in an unduly narrow manner, critics argue that 
ICL has ‘arrogated’ to itself the term ‘justice,’ reducing the concept to criminal law when it 
could include economic and social justice.  The ‘stranglehold’ civil and political 84
interpretations of human rights enjoys on the progressivist imaginations and social 
movements in the developing world has long been identified as a barrier to more socio-
economically emancipatory thinking.  Critics of ICL have long argued that individual 85
criminal responsibility not only fails to properly situate crimes within a broader structural 
context underpinning suffering,  but that ‘the overexposure of international criminal law 86
blinds the world’ to the types of slow, structural violence to which the same direct causality 
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cannot be attributed as is found in ICL.  Indeed, to the extent that ICL brings to justice only 87
those within its remit who commit bodily integrity crimes, it implicitly exonerates those 
domestic and international actors who fall outside it who may have committed other abuses.   88
  
D.  Complicity with Conservative Domestic Elites 
Peacebuilders practically operate under time and resource constraints, and so in turn are 
reliant on collaboration with (or lack of obstruction from) domestic leaders if their projects 
are to be brought about effectively. This gives the latter a diffuse but unambiguous veto 
power on rulership or state reconstruction, resulting in a dyadic relationship based on a mix 
of conflictual and co-operative strategies, a reality often described as ‘compromised 
peacebuilding’.  Critics of peacebuilding argue that there is a natural tendency in such a 89
system to depend on pre-existing elites, often those with a strong inclination to maintain 
existing political and economic inequalities, to mediate issues of security to the exclusion of 
the many.   As Darby and MacGinty put it, peacebuilding  90
often reinforces power-holders and replicates exclusive patterns of social and political 
relations ……in many peace processes, participants have been unwilling or unable to 
challenge prevailing patterns of social and political organisation. Although violence 
ends, patterns of land ownership, patriarchy, and political participation remain 
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unchanged. As a result, the ‘peace’ is essentially conservative rather than 
transformative.   91
It is further argued that ostensibly liberalising features like constitutionalisation, and the 
creation of power-knowledge systems like media, law, education and electoral democracy in 
fact merely make ground for institutional stabilisation.  In a shell state willing to settle for 92
such limited aims, there is a natural tendency to fall back on conservative peace-as-order 
models that seek to make “life made predictable and relatively safe” to regulate conflict 
through security and coercion.   93
        The possibility that ICL serves to bolster conservative, if not abusive, domestic regimes 
is also one that animates its critics. ICL shares the need for dyadic, co-operative relationships 
with domestic regimes to an arguably even greater degree than peacebuilders. Being 
essentially free-standing institutions without police powers, international courts are in terms 
of enforcement strikingly weak – ‘giants without limbs’ in former Court President Antonio 
Cassese’s famous terms, utterly reliant on the artificial limbs of state authorities to walk and 
work in the states to which they turn their attention.  The ICC, for example, is entirely 94
reliant on the assistance of states to arrest suspects, collect evidence, ensure access to 
witnesses, outreach and preserve the security of its personnel. In securing this co-operation, 
critics observe the ICC accommodating the governments of states whose assistance it needs, 
 J. Darby and R. Mac Ginty, ‘Introduction: What Peace? What Process?’, in J. Darby and R. Mac Ginty (eds) 91
Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 
1, at 6.
 Outi Korhonen, ‘The “State-Building Enterprise”: Legal Doctrine, Progress Narratives and Managerial 92
Governance’ in Bowden, Charlesworth and Farrall (eds), supra note 49, at 16.
 M. Banks, ‘Four Conceptions of Peace’, in D. Sandole and I. Sandole-Staroste (eds), Conflict Management 93
and Problem Solving: Interpersonal to International Applications (London: F. Pinter, 1987), 259 at 261.
 A. Cassese, ‘On the Current Trends towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of Breaches of 94
International Humanitarian Law’, 9 European Journal of International Law (1998) 2, at 13.
!  26
notwithstanding their own possible complicity in crimes.  It is notable that in Uganda, the 95
Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali and Cote d’Ivoire, 
ICC proceedings have been directed solely against the ‘rebels’; i.e. those acting against the 
present government or supporting political rivals.  Inasmuch as it pursues prosecutions but 96
leaves their governments essentially untouched, the ICC’s discourse of ownership mimics the 
peace-as-order governance regimes of parallel peacebuilding efforts.   97
4. Future Trajectories: Steering a Path Between Irrelevance and Assimilation? 
For projects like CAICL, critique often presents itself as a dialectic between irrelevance and 
assimilation. As regards irrelevance, critics of ICL may find themselves in the position of 
‘dangerous heretic,’ casually disdained with unreflective dismissals of cynicism and moral 
relativism, ignored because they proffer intellectual abstractions instead of solutions to the 
problems identified.   Greater interaction with practice, by contrast, raises the diametrically 98
opposed risk of complicity in replicating the terms and structures of the object of critque.  99
Critical engagement is often to ICL’s practitioners and advocates not merely something 
approximating sacrilege but also an active impediment to addressing its problems.  Others, 100
by contrast, believe the critique is, or at least should be, as concerned with empowerment as it 
is with deconstruction - the field cannot adopt a purely rejectionist attitude to ICL but should 
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attempt to capture it for emancipatory outcomes or divert attention to new frontiers.   101
This would fit with Philip Alston’s recent counsel to creatively explore the art of the possible 
within real-world constraints and compromises, on the basis that too much critical 
scholarship is formulaic and insufficiently focused on means and methods to confront 
challenges identified.  Based on the trajectories of the critical peacebuilding project, one 102
might speculate on the options this seeming double bind presents for critics of ICL. Critical 
peacebuilding has found itself presented with a similar dilemma of whether to present 
alternative ‘blueprints’ to the predominant approaches or remain true to its traditional mission 
of pointing out the pitfalls and contradictions of peacebuilding to increase context sensitivity 
from within the field.  This reconsideration may have been spurred by the acknowledgment 103
that, at least for some, the most significant failing of the critique ‘has been its inability to 
engage in a fuller way’ with the policy mainstream.  Although peacebuilding scholarship 104
remains dominated by critical perspectives, an intrinsic divide between ‘optimistic 
practitioners’ and ‘pessimist or at least sceptical academics and theoreticians’ remains in 
place.  It became apparent that if critics were to remedy their lack of policy influence they 105
would need to develop sharper theoretical tools to comprehend the complexities of liberal 
peacebuilding.   106
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A. Irrelevance  
In contradistinction to conservative peacebuilding approaches emphasizing coercion and 
domination, critics of liberal peacebuilding have attempted to outline emancipatory models 
of ‘post-liberal’ peace. Instead of focusing on top-down security and institutions, it is 
proposed that peacebuilders enjoy closer relationships with intervened-upon societies and 
base their operations on local ownership and consent, with a greater concern for social justice 
and local agency.  An ethical reading of peacebuilding is believed to require ‘a willingness 107
to recognise local ownership, human rights, culture, social and grass roots resources for self-
government’ and ‘infers an engagement with the everyday, to provide care, to empathise, and 
to enable emancipation.’  It is argued that if local, elite and international visions of peace 108
are connected by careful and sensitive partnership and without automatic deference to the 
expectations of interveners, then a social-democratic and welfare-oriented state redistributing 
wealth via taxation and international subvention can and will emerge organically.   109
 However, critical visions of an alternative peace often suffer from a lack of detail and 
concrete tactical links to post-conflict politics. Visions of ‘post-liberal’ peace tend to combine 
an emphasis on a wider and more diverse set of relationships within society with an 
ambitious wish list of outcomes (e.g public service delivery, job security, employment and 
poverty alleviation). What is often missing is an agenda of how a wider set of relationships 
within society will lead to the desired outcomes.  One such proposal, for example, is based 110
on the idea of ‘unscripted conversations’ between the local recipients of peacebuilding 
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operations and other actors, elites and local communities around the type of peace they 
want.  The type of democracy proposed is not one that links local consensus on peace to 111
parallel elite efforts, but is instead a ‘broader attitude towards governance, political 
community and life in general.’  Questions of democracy and governance certainly need to 112
be rethought. However, an issue which remains unaddressed is if such unscripted 
conversations lead to radically different conclusions within local communities about the type 
of peace they want, as might reasonably be expected in violently divided states.  At which 
point can the ‘ongoing critique’ and ‘the fluidity of continuous adjustment’ be hardened to 
something more tangible?  Interventions by peacebuilders on the ground which deal with 113
issues of power, security or territory in a way that foregrounds (institutional) reform are 
regularly dismissed by critical theorists as problem-solving meta-narratives which maintain 
the status quo.  Indeed, the temptation to focus exclusively on problematizing the 114
ontological or epistemological claims of liberal interveners in isolation of an analysis of 
interventions on the lives of individuals, or their environment, has the potential to leave 
critical theorists isolated from policy discourse on the ground.  Peacebuilding critics have 115
themselves acknowledged that a great deal of their work is as much about the field’s ability to 
respond to the internal divisions and contradictions within peacebuilding discourses as it is 
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about how those discourses transpire outside itself in the context of post-conflict ecology.  116
Others admits that their critiques provide no functional way forward to an improved practice 
beyond problematizing and deconstructing liberal peacebuilding.  117
          Similarly, it is unclear whether a CAICL project has any potential remedial role for 
conflicted societies. This is partly due to the fact that structural critique often lies outside of 
the ambit of ICL. The observation that ICL is symptomatic of the politics of great powers, 
corporate power, and domestic elites, opens up the necessity of a deeper post-colonial and 
post-modern critique. Indeed, one of the key elements of the CLS critique of criminal law is 
that trial and judgment are inescapably tied to individual cases and not the vast web of 
economic, social and political structures that underpin an individual’s resort to breaking the 
law. Even if the critique succeeded in fostering a willingness among international criminal 
courts to discuss the root causes of the crimes they process, it might not be met with a 
commensurate capacity to accurately capture it or propose responses. The critique is valuable 
in demonstrating ICL is not the remedy to the roots of conflict, but it might also make 
apparent that international tribunals are unlikely to generate any answers.  
The critique of ICL is valuable, then, in showing how international criminal courts and 
tribunals could partly redress their legitimacy deficit by engaging in an anti-hegemonic 
prosecutorial policy, altering their ‘hero-saviour’ self-presentation or their instrumentalisation 
of victims. (Only) these problems lie within the remit of ICL to ameliorate. Nevertheless, it is 
no mean feat to spell out how the vehicle of ICL could effectively protect against other forms 
of violence. Indeed, while feminist critiques of ICL have succeeded in ensuring women’s 
experiences of sexual violence have been addressed by international criminal tribunals, ICL 
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has proven a limited and limiting forum for wider feminist-inspired change in relation to the 
broader economic and patriarchal context within which a trial is rooted. As Sander observes, 
‘the political limits of [criminal] institutions also reflect potentially insurmountable 
emancipatory limits on what they will ever be able to achieve in practice.  By recognizing 118
these limits, greater time, imagination and energy can be directed towards the creation and 
development of other emancipatory projects.’  In so far as the critical peacebuilding field is 119
interested in law and legal institutions, it can learn from the CAICL literature that law too is 
entrenched in the systemic processes which create and recreate inequality, perhaps even by its 
very form. 
          
B. Assimilation 
It has been argued that insofar as there are alternative visions of justice or peace within 
CAICL or critical peacebuilding projects, these are in fact based on liberal principles. For 
example, the principles emphasized by critical peace scholars like consent, local ownership, 
use of traditional practices, participation, empathy and ‘solidarity of the governed’ are 
unobjectionable as general principles in liberal peacebuilding theory. Ostensibly different 
visions of peacebuilding premised on deliberative, constitutional republicanism and post-
liberalism are rooted in undeniably liberal values like self-government, political participation 
and limited government.  Ultimately, therefore, it is argued that the critical peacebuilding 120
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literature espouses variations within this tradition, as opposed to alternatives to it.  Even the 121
most critical scholars of the liberal peace like Oliver Richmond accept the need as part of any 
sustainable peace for those staples of liberal policy like (a) the state and its institutions to 
represent the interests of political subjects,  (b) the ‘narrow security issues’ like 122
disarmament, demobilization and security sector reform, (c) democracy, law and human 
rights  and (d) the rationalized, strategic, securitized top-down orthodoxy of politics.  123 124
Indeed, some contend that much of the welfarism and poverty alleviation on which critical 
alternatives to the liberal peace are premised implicitly represents a ‘nostalgia’ for the liberal 
social contract – critics are not rejecting intervention, but want to control it via forms of 
Western social contracting familiar in the post-WWII Global North before the ascendancy of 
neoliberal economic policy.  125
 This inability to escape the parameters of the object of critique is one that potentially 
faces CAICL also. Even if the critique succeeds in making ICL more sensitive to its 
problematic sides or more concerned with everyday lives in the intervened-upon societies 
than its own institutional self-preservation, ICL will inevitably reproduce some of its own 
institutional, jurisdictional and philosophical limitations. The extent to which such 
reproduction then becomes complicity is the treacherous line between reform and revolution, 
between tactics and strategy.  Sara Kendall offers the example of moving to field-driven 126
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rather than Hague-driven investigations which would undoubtedly be a welcome 
improvement, but concedes it would merely support the type of efficiency critique the critical 
field aspires to move beyond.  Of course, reflexive critics of ICL must remain wary that if 127
the CAICL critique makes an impact, the ICL project may succeed in incorporating parts of it 
in ways that merely deflect criticism without any thoroughgoing reconsideration of the field’s 
biases.   128
5. Concluding Remarks 
The disappointment at the empirical records and biases evident in both peacebuilding and 
ICL have increased the relevance of critique that radically disrupts the previously taken-for-
granted principles and institutions. Two similar bodies of sophisticated critique about the 
hegemonic nature of the mainstream peacebuilding and ICL projects, their naïve technicism, 
their potential complicity in repressive domestic politics and their marginalization of socio-
economic issues have emerged out of this disappointment. We find that CAICL has much to 
learn from both the substance and the trajectory of the liberal peacebuilding critique. The 
substance of the critique can deepen and enrich critical theory in relation to ICL, highlighting 
how parallel interventionist projects can compound the problems. The trajectory of the 
critique is also instructive – at a certain point, scholars may chafe against the limitations of a 
critique without or with little impact on policy, and face the questions firstly of whether to 
engage with the dilemmas of practitioners in the object of study, and secondly what that 
engagement may look like. From the liberal peacebuilding critique we learn -  if we did not 
know this already - that influence in scholarly discourse is not automatically converted into 
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practice on the ground. Just as critics of liberal peacebuilding appear to stumble from the 
dangers of assimilation to the pitfalls of irrelevance, this fate may beset critical projects in 
ICL also. The critical peacebuilding literature may in turn learn from the CAICL critique 
about the limitations of law and its institutions whilst recognizing the power it wields for 
tactical radical purposes. 
 With the more radical critique entering the mainstream, both the mainstream and the 
critique may reconfigure into a more meaningful, mutually-constituted discourse. This can 
lead to a greater reflexivity on the part of CAICL, and with that a change in the dialectical 
relationship between irrelevance and assimilation. Both critical peacebuilding and CAICL 
realize their potential most by harassing their respective disciplines when they engage in 
hubris, by initiating conversations about the revised future practice of their respective 
apparatuses, by drawing attention to the hidden distributive effects of their practices, and 
relatedly by revealing the moments in which they benefit the powerful at the expense of the 
weak. And yet, we do not pretend to provide a conclusion which provides a solution. The 
irrelevance/assimilation dilemma cannot be resolved; instead the recognition of the dilemma 
can act as a reminder of the necessity for constant self-reflection and navigation. 
Nevertheless, inasmuch as critique assumes the role of asking the difficult questions, and 
particularly the ones concerning structures of inequality, to never be content, to eschew the 
comfort zone of efficiency critiques, it may point the way to a more reflective and legitimate 
practice.  
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